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1. INTRODUCTION
The German constitution stresses the importance of
legislation below central government level. A substantial
proportion of federal laws – especially those affecting
revenues from joint central (Bund) and state (Länder)
government taxes – requires the approval of the second
legislative chamber, the Bundesrat, where state governments
are represented. In addition, budgetary autonomy is also
assigned to the individual federal states. They are also
responsible for their borrowing rules and for the finances of
the local governments (Gemeinden) within their jurisdiction.
As a large number of tasks must be fulfilled by state
governments and local authorities, the sum of their budgets
clearly exceeds central government expenditure. With regard
to capital formation, local authorities contribute about 60%
to general government expenditure, while the remainder is
accounted for in almost equal parts by state and central
government. However, since the late 1960s, regular
borrowing limits as laid down in the federal and state
constitutions refer to the sum of investment expenditure in
budgetary terms. Therefore, not only capital formation but
also acquisitions of financial assets and investment grants to
other parts of general government or enterprises may be used
to justify borrowing. Asset sales and depreciation allowances
are not taken into account. Consequently, deficit financing is
not restricted to the net increase in government assets but
may also be chosen for replacements and subsidies for the
private sector. At the local government level, however,
stricter rules apply. In most federal states, long-term
borrowing may only be used by local authorities to finance
investment expenditure if the respective municipality can
prove its ability to bear additional debt burdens. As regular
redemptions have to be financed from current revenue, such
borrowing is restricted in principle to net investments. 
In general, borrowing limits in Germany do not seem to be
very demanding for central and state government budgets.
While the largest parts of the deficits throughout the last
decades were incurred at the central level, state governments
also significantly contrib-uted to the Maastricht deficit. The
maximum level reached almost 1 ½% of GDP in 2003. On
the other hand, local governments recorded limited
borrowing requirements of less than ½% of GDP. 
2. CONTINUED BREACHES OF THE
MAASTRICHT DEFICIT LIMIT AND
TEMPORARY MEASURES
Between 2002 and 2004, Germany had exceeded the 3%
deficit limit set by the Maastricht treaty three times in a row
– thus not following the initial Ecofin-Council instruction to
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1The views expressed are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect those of the Bundesbank.eliminate the excessive deficit in 2004 at the latest. Despite
being the main contributor to the high deficit level, the
central government faced severe problems in bringing the
German figures in line with European rules. On the
expenditure side, the most important items, accounting for
2/3 of total central government expenditure, are grants for
the statutory old-age pension scheme, interest payments,
costs arising from long-term unemployment and defence.
Treaties and constitutional commitments leave only
moderate room for expenditure cuts in these areas. With
regard to staff levels, the budgets contained reductions of
about 1 ½% per year. However, given the relatively low
share of compensation of employees in the federal budget
(7%), the effects remained limited. Planned revenue-
increasing measures affecting joint taxes, which yield about
three quarters of German tax receipts, were not given the
necessary approval by the Bundesrat, which was dominated
by governments led by the big opposition party in the
Bundestag (the Christian Democrats). Reaching agreements
with the second chamber often involved additional burdens
being placed on the central government budget. For example,
in order to gain approval for the labour market reform in
2005, the central government had to promise to safeguard
relief of € 2.5 bn per year for local authorities, which was
ultimately taken from the federal budget. Such approval was
not needed in order to raise consumption taxes as revenues
accrue only to the central government budget. Following
several increases made between 1999 and 2003 in order to
finance additional grants for the statutory old-age pension
scheme, growth in revenues from mineral oil taxes had come
to a halt. Tobacco taxes had already been raised in order to
finance measures for combatting international terrorism.
Further increases from 2004 onwards were expected to
generate about 0.2% of GDP for grants for the statutory
health insurance scheme aimed at lowering contribution rates
in order to promote employment. However, almost no
additional revenues were observed, thus putting additional
strains on central government deficit figures. Consequently,
there seemed to be only limited scope for budgetary
improvements by means of consolidation measures taken by
central government. 
Budgetary problems in 2005 – which by the end of 2004 was
believed to be the decisive year for bringing the deficit in line
with European rules – were augmented by the last step of the
significant income tax rate reductions between 2001 and
2005. These were approved during the last boom period,
when higher GDP trend growth was expected that would
have enabled German general government to compensate for
the tax cuts. However, several years of near-stagnation had
followed and tax revenues had developed even worse than
what might have been deducted from the macroeconomic
figures and legislative changes. 
Following the official tax estimate in November 2004, a
further drop in revenue expectations had to be compensated
for in order to reach a deficit ratio of slightly less than 3%.
Opportunities for sizeable consolidation measures were
limited as tax revenues were impaired by the last step of rate
cuts as well as by expected ongoing decoupling from the
development of the macroeconomic tax bases; therefore,
temporary measures similar to those used in other European
countries seemed to offer an escape. Between 1997 and
2004, some central governments had taken over old-age
pension obligations from enterprises in exchange for
substantial one-off payments. As national accounts on the
basis of ESA 1995 do not record unfunded pension
obligations which are to be paid by general government,
such payments were treated as unrequited transfers with a
positive effect on the Maastricht deficit. In Germany, the
successor companies of the Bundespost had to bear pension
obligations for their civil servants. In the nineties, Deutsche
Telekom, Deutsche Post and Deutsche Postbank were
obliged to pay old-age pension contributions of 33% of the
wage sum of the civil servants still employed. Annual
amounts of just over € 1 ½ bn were just sufficient to finance
a quarter of total pension payments for retired civil servants.
Since 1999, about € 5 bn (¼% of GDP) had to be added
from the central government budget every year in order to
avoid deficits and an accumulation of debt within this
pension scheme. Copying similar cases in Europe would
have required the successor companies to be released from
their pension obligations. The net present value of the
comparable contribution duties amounted to ¾% of GDP.
This would have generated sufficient revenue for central
government to avoid another breach of the Maastricht
deficit ceiling in 2005. However, the companies did not
want to incur this amount of additional debt. Another
approach therefore had to be found. Finally, an agreement
was reached to securitise the contribution claims. In 2005
and 2006, two transactions took place, yielding € 15 ½ bn
for the pension scheme. Consequently, the central
government did not have to make any payments in those two
years and only minor funding was planned for 2007. If the
pension scheme had been booked outside the government
sector, this would have reduced the Maastricht deficit. As
the securitisation was a sale of future revenue, the ESA 1995
accounting rules made it necessary to treat it as borrowing of
the respective sector. However, Eurostat resisted to classify
the pension scheme as part of the enterprise sector given the
very strong influence exerted by central government on the
pension scheme. In the end, it was reclassified within the
government sector. Hence, no deficit-reducing effect was
recorded and the excessive deficit could not be eliminated.
After the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005,
however, no further steps were taken within the excessive
deficit procedure and no fine had to be paid. Instead, as
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central government was granted another two years to bring
the deficit ratio back below the 3% limit. 
At the state government level, some temporary measures had
repercussions on the Maastricht deficit. However, these
transactions were mainly aimed at avoiding breaches of
constitutional borrowing limits. These limits, which are based
on investment expenditure, are not corrected for sales of
assets. Hence, such transactions were chosen as an easy way of
alleviating short-term budgetary pressures. State governments,
in most cases, do not possess large enterprises that could be
privatised as easily as Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom.
Instead, subcentral governments have many administrative
tasks and consequently need numerous buildings. Given the
substantial increases in real asset prices in the United States
and most European countries government buildings could be
sold at reasonable prices and were rented back. In particular,
the state governments of Hamburg and Hesse used this
opportunity in 2005 (and to a lesser extent in 2006) to sell
government buildings for almost € 2 bn. These transactions
were classified as sales of non-financial assets and hence
reduced the German Maastricht deficit ratio by slightly below
0.1 percentage point. Other state governments took similar
measures, but they had reorganised the ownership structure of
the buildings in order to enhance the efficiency of their asset
management. After the outsourcing of the assets into public
corporations, only financial transactions with no direct effect
on the Maastricht deficit were recorded. However, this was
not considered to be important as the money received
prevented the constitutional borrowing limits of the respective
states from being exceeded. 
Other temporary measures taken by state governments
referred to interest claims. Owing to loans mainly granted to
home construction companies and Landesbanken, state
governments regularly receive interest payments. In order to
alleviate budgetary pressures, sales of interest claims were
discussed in several states. The biggest transaction occurred
in Baden-Württemberg, reaching almost € ¾ bn over two
years (slightly less than 0.02% of GDP in each year).
However, the budget flagged these revenues as privatisation
proceeds without any direct effect on the Maastricht deficit.
In other states, smaller transactions may have been treated
differently, but the overall effect on the general government
deficit ratio should have remained small.
3. BUDGETARY RELIEF DUE 
TO POLITICAL CHANGES AND
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Besides the changes to the European Stability and Growth
Pact in 2005, which reduced the time pressure for bringing
the deficit ratio in line with the Maastricht limit, a political
change occurred. The coalition between the Social
Democrats and the Green Party had lost a series of elections
in the German states and opposition parties were close to a
2/3 majority in the Bundesrat that would have enabled them
to block federal legislation almost completely. The central
government wanted to hold early elections in order to receive
a renewed mandate from the voters. However, neither the
government nor the conservative-liberal opposition parties
gained a majority. In the end, the two major parties – the
Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats – formed a
coalition. This government has a very large majority in the
Bundestag as well as in the Bundesrat. As most state
governments were facing severe budgetary problems in 2005
– only two of the sixteen states did not require asset sales or
misuse of federal infrastructure development grants for
Eastern Germany in order to avoid breaching the
constitutional borrowing limits – even unpopular tax hikes
found support in the Bundesrat given the lack of a major
opposition party. 
Notwithstanding this, no additional consolidation measures
were implemented for 2006 as a whole, while expenditure
growth remained subdued. However, strong GDP growth
and – to an even greater extent – an unexpected additional
increase in revenues from profit-related taxes helped to
eliminate the excessive deficit in that year already. Budgetary
problems, especially at the central government level, could
not be completely solved by that. The budget had envisaged
a borrowing requirement of € 38 bn, which exceeded the
investment-expenditure-related constitutional limit by € 15
bn. The deficit outcome of € 28 bn was much more
favourable, but still clearly above the regular limit in the
German constitution. The fundamental position – calculated
by just excluding budgetary relief from asset sales or
securitisations – was actually far worse as such transactions
amounted to about € 15 bn in 2006. Thus, despite the
significant improvement in the general government
Maastricht deficit figures, a fundamental gap of about € 20
bn with regard to the constitutional borrowing limit had to
be closed. For that reason, the 2007 tax hikes announced
after the 2005 general election could not be revoked despite
the significant improvement of the overall budgetary
situation. 
As a consequence of these consolidation measures and the
aforementioned additional positive developments, most
states and the central government have been able to keep
their deficits in line with the current constitutional borrowing
limits in 2007. It is possible that nine out of sixteen states
might even have at least a balanced budget in 2007, while the
central government in particular is still facing a borrowing
requirement of slightly above € 20 bn excluding one-off
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latest medium-term financial plan foresees a balanced budget
in 2011.
2 This was considered as being in line with the
European agreement concerning objectives for 2010 as other
government sectors were expected to have sufficient
surpluses by then. In order to prevent a return to high deficits
and increasing debt ratios a change of the constitutional
borrowing rules is planned. This is expected to be part of the
second stage of the reform of the German federal system to
be agreed upon by the major parties and state governments
before the next general election, which is scheduled for 2009.
With regard to transparency and simplicity, following the
rules laid down in the European Stability and Growth Pact
seems to be a promising approach also for constitutional
borrowing limits.
3
4. PPPS AS A SIGNIFICANT LOOPHOLE
UNDER BALANCED BUDGET RULES
As investment expenditures are expected to generate utility in
the future, present taxpayers may want to pass on at least part
of the financing burdens. The current budgetary borrowing
restrictions do not set any limits on this. However, if in
future structural net borrowing is no longer allowed, other
ways to shift burdens may be sought. Public private
partnerships (PPPs) might be a particularly attractive option.
Private companies commit themselves to build, operate and
maintain public infrastructure for several years or even
decades. According to a Eurostat decision clarifying ESA
1995 accounting rules for PPPs, the respective capital
formation expenditures do not have a direct impact on the
Maastricht deficit if the private partner takes over at least the
financial risks involved in construction and the availability of
the respective asset or demand fluctuations.
4 The government
partner does not have to pay bills according to the progress
of construction works. Instead, regular service fees are
charged over a long-term period. Besides interest on invested
capital also redemption payments may be included in the fees
if the government finally becomes the owner of the assets.
Such treaties come very close to credit contracts. Hence,
from the perspective of budgetary accounts, PPPs could be
used to circumvent balanced budget rules. Under such
circumstances, efforts to promote the use of PPP models in
Germany have to be observed carefully. Reported cost
savings of up to 20% of total costs incurred over the lifecycle
of a project might be another good reason for using such
models. However, in practice it will be difficult to judge
whether the circumvention of budgetary rules might also be
important. 
While central government accounts for only a minor part of
government capital formation, it has major responsibilities in
the field of long-distance road construction. At present, two
different types of treaties for cooperation with private
partners are available. The first (“A-model”) consists of
treaties assigning investment expenditure needed for the six-
lane development of existing motorway sections to a private
partner who will subsequently receive federal truck tolls
collected for the respective sections. In spring 2007, the first
respective construction works were started.
5 Treaties for four
additional motorway extensions are expected to be signed
soon or have already been agreed upon. Total respective
capital formation expenditure is estimated to reach € 1.2 bn
overall (0.05% of current GDP).
6 The other way of
integrating private partners was already created in the
nineties, but its use is still limited. Specific road construction
projects like bridges, tunnels and new motorway sections on
mountain slopes may be financed using fees collected outside
the federal truck toll system (“F-model”). The lack of
profitability of the first projects – the two streets can be
circumvented by using somewhat longer toll-free roads –
seem to impair the prospects of this model. The Fehmarnbelt
bridge project would have been an opportunity to revitalise
this model, but the responsibility for the main capital
formation expenditure of about € 4 bn was taken over by the
Danish government. 
5. OFF-BUDGET ACTIVITIES BY LOCAL
AUTHORITIES
As mentioned above, borrowing limits for local governments
are much stricter. Those municipalities still using cash
accounting are in principle only allowed to take up a regular
loan if their current revenues exceed total current
expenditures plus redemption payments due.
7 After the
changeover to business accounting, which in early-acting
states has to be finished by 2009, the sum of yields has to be
at least equal to the total costs including depreciation
allowances – a requirement which may be even stricter.
8 In
most states, local government borrowing envisaged in the
budget has to be approved by a supervisory institution. For
larger municipalities, this task is designated to state
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2 Only three state governments are expected to need more time to balance their budgets.
3 See for example Deutsche Bundesbank (2007b), p. 47 ff.
4 See Eurostat (2004).
5 See Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (2007b).
6 See Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (2007a), p. 14.
7 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2000), p. 45.
8 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2007a), p. 42 f.government, which ultimately might have to assume
responsibility. However, owing to revenue shortfalls and
significant social expenditure increases, many municipalities
were not able to balance their budgets as prescribed and
financed even current expenditure via short-term cash
advances which were not to be included in the budgets.
9 In
2007, cash advances have reached a level of almost € 30 bn
(just over 25% of local governments’ debt stock).
Problems with keeping borrowing in line with the budgetary
rules and the large responsibility in the field of government
capital formation expenditure made PPP projects especially
attractive for local governments. However, PPPs might be
judged as contracts that are similar to borrowing. In that case,
approval of supervisory institutions will also be needed.
Hence, an extension of leeway for local politicians cannot be
directly derived from such agreements. Nevertheless, as part
of the government system and thus dependent on electoral
support, supervisory institutions in practice have only limited
possibility to forbid projects deemed politically important.
Urgently needed school building maintenance works, for
example, seem to be hard to stop by claiming budgetary
problems. By limiting current budgetary pressures, PPPs
might be more easily approved than investment projects
which would have to be financed immediately from the
budget. Given the current borrowing limits for central and
state governments, which are based on investment
expenditure, PPP projects were mainly a feature for local
governments over the past few years. According to a survey,
they were in charge of 38 out of all 46 PPP projects
(excluding road construction) agreed upon between 2003
and 2005. The total multi-year capital formation expenditure
involved was still limited and amounted to just € 1.4 bn
(0.06% of overall annual GDP). Compared with the total
ESA 1995 government investment of € 31 bn in 2005, the
share seems to have still remained below 2%, while figures
for the UK, which is considered to be the PPP-benchmark in
Germany, reached almost 15%. Although 120 planned
additional projects were estimated as including multi-year
capital formation expenditure of about € 6 bn,
10 the
difference in shares between the UK and Germany will still
remain significant. 
The limited use of PPPs in Germany is not only to be
explained by the budgetary rules. In addition, some legal
disadvantages with respect to taxes must also be taken into
account. Until the PPP acceleration law came into force in
2005, local taxes on immovable property were charged for
each project, while governments were granted exemptions.
Similarly to taxes on immovable property, real property
transfer tax is still levied unless PPPs are used for government
activities and the government partner regains ownership
later. Furthermore, services offered by PPP companies are
subject to turnover tax, raising prices substantially. Finally,
investment grants often play an important role, especially for
local government projects. While financing investment
expenditure directly from the budget does not pose any
problems in that context, PPPs may be judged differently –
particularly if the private partner is the legal owner of the
respective assets. Altogether, an extended use of PPPs in
Germany still seems to depend partly on changes in the legal
conditions.
But even if conditions for PPPs were to improve further and
the number of such projects were to increase significantly,
public finance analysis need not face major problems. When
calculating the deficit figures for the Maastricht notification,
the national statistical authority takes a prudential approach,
classifying assets according to counterpart information from
construction enterprises. Consequently, PPPs are expected to
be labelled as government investment expenditure with a
direct effect on the deficit.
11 Given the common structure of
limited transfer of risks and ownership to private partners,
this seems adequate.
However, until now PPPs have seemed to be only a minor
off-budget item compared with the outsourcing of public
entities that has taken place since the 1990s.
12 One important
reason for this type of restructuring of local government
activities were the restrictions resulting from special rules for
public employees and their compensation, government
accounting and procurement. In order to gain more
flexibility, entities were separated from the administration.
Enterprises with limited autonomy and/or public enterprises
with legal independence were founded and no longer
included in the local government budgets as those institutions
have a separate accounting system. Only payments between
the administration and the enterprises have to be recorded
within the framework of government budgetary statistics.
With regard to the national accounts, the enterprises tend to
be considered as institutional units outside the government
sector. Besides having their own accounting systems, they
generally cover most of their costs using fees collected from
users and are also deemed to have sufficient autonomy
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9 Notwithstanding, this type of borrowing is included in ex-post budgetary as well as national accounts deficit figures. The stock of cash advances is also included in
the Maastricht debt.
10 For the data see Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (2007a), p. 12.
11 See Eurostat (2007). 
12 For an estimate of the effects since 2000 see Deutsche Bundesbank (2007a), p. 33 ff. A more detailed analysis of the effects of outsourcing on budgetary data can be
found in Deutsche Bundesbank (2000), p. 50-53.concerning their main activities. While, in particular, budget
figures for the compensation of employees and capital
formation expenditures are lower than without outsourcing,
this should on balance be practically offset by lower fee
revenues and increased other operating expenditure. The net
effect on the deficit should thus – if at all – be relatively small.
As public utilities are also expected to cover their
depreciation allowances, outsourcing of such enterprises
might sometimes even lead to slightly higher deficits.
However, disaggregated analyses of local government budget
developments and comparisons between different
municipalities are significantly impeded. Nevertheless, as
most local governments will switch over to business
accounting within a few years, they will have to integrate
outsourced amenities into their accounting system again and
such distortions may disappear. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
Temporary measures played an important role in Germany in
the first years of this century. However, most of them were
intended to keep net borrowing within the constitutional limits
and had no effect on the Maastricht deficit. Following the
significant reduction of budget deficits since the end of 2005,
achieving balanced budgets as prescribed by the European
Stability and Growth Pact gained importance. Under such
circumstances, budgetary leeway can be extended by using
PPPs instead of government capital formation expenditure.
Therefore, in order to avoid simple circumventions of
borrowing limits, it could become necessary to establish a
safeguard. This could be achieved by restricting the use of PPPs
to cases in which significant cost advantages can be expected
while also fixing a maximum level for capital formation
expenditure involved in such contracts. The extension of off-
budget activities through the outsourcing of public services
observed over the past few years, mainly at the local and to
some extent also at state government level, seems to have had
only limited repercussions on the deficit figures. Structural
breaks in specific revenue and expenditure categories caused
by outsourcing may be corrected after a changeover to business
accounting which is expected, at least for local governments,
within the next years. 
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